Footnotes

¹Sc. The argument proceeds invalidly from a premise about being simply to a conclusion about this or that sort of being in particular.

²The argument in n.18 is: (major premise) instruments are things that work dispositively for the principal effect; (minor premise) nothing at work in creation is a thing that works dispositively for the principal effect; (conclusion) therefore nothing at work in creation is an instrument. This syllogism is in the second figure and is only valid if the major premise is universal. But the major premise is false as a universal and only true as a particular.

³The three conditions for being an object of understanding are: cause, measure, term of intellection; cf. Ord. 1 d.3 nn.477-479.

⁴Scotus Rep. A d.13 q. un.: “By this word ‘intention’ is meant in one way an act of will; in a second way the formal idea in a thing (as the intention of a thing from which the genus is taken differs from the intention from which the difference is taken); in a third way a concept; in the fourth way the idea of tending to an object (as a likeness is said to be the idea of tending to that of which it is the likeness).”

⁵This reply seems to be against all three of the arguments given here against the truth of the minor premise [sc. the minor that the disposition previous to grace, if it is posited, will be something that has to be created directly by God, and so not an instrument God uses for creation, n.285]. For if, as the reply says, the obediential potency in a creature is relative to the active power that realizes it, and if this active power is God acting alone without a created instrument, and if the disposition previous to grace is drawn from the obediential power, then it will be something created, regardless of whether it is a form, and regardless of whether it is unlike the intellect and grace (which are confessedly created).

⁶The sense of the Latin here is obscure. The point seems to be that the spoken word only informs us about the thing spoken of because, first, we already have the concept of that thing, and because, second, we are moved by the words to turn to the relevant species or phantasm of the thing so as thereby to bring actually to mind the concept we already have of it. The words, then, do nothing over and above stimulating us to turn to some species or phantasm in which to remember or rethink the concept (as the previous example of a Latin speaking to a Greek illustrates).

⁷The square brackets replace what in Scotus’ Latin is simply ‘it’ with no clearly grammatical indication of what the ‘it’ refers back to. My insertions in the brackets indicate what I think should be understood by each ‘it’ to make consistent sense of what Scotus is saying.

⁸That is: because natural rectitude can exist without grace (as you admit it did before the fall), it does not include the idea of grace in itself. So it is separable from grace, and it does not cease to be so separable just because its opposite (guilt) existed in its subject, namely the soul, through the fall. So natural rectitude can exist in the soul again after the fall with the same separability from grace, that is, it can exist there again without grace.

⁹An obscure paragraph which perhaps means that grace has a meritorious cause that is fully deserving in Christ himself but not in the (justified) sinner, who receives that grace from Christ, although once the sinner has received grace he has it in himself now as a meritorious cause that fully deserves what grace brings with it. So Christ’s passion can be a meritorious cause that fully deserves grace for the sinner, and yet grace in the sinner is gratuitous and not deserved by the sinner (as the Apostle says). Once, however, grace is given gratuitously to the sinner by Christ, the sinner has a meritorious cause that fully deserves the rewards of grace.

¹⁰This issue does not arise in English or some other languages, because the pronoun ‘I’ must be expressed in addition to the verb to complete the sense.

¹¹The Vatican editors note that all these arguments, nn.30-40, were already set down by Richard of Middleton in his Sent. IV d.3 princ.2 q3. The same holds of several of the opening arguments in the following questions.

¹²The Vatican editors note that Scotus wrote ‘four’, but they correct it to ‘three’ because Scotus seems only to deal with three in what follows. However, it may be that Scotus is adverting to the fact that the third (about the words of the sacrament) has two sub-parts, about the non-principal words and about the principal words, which makes four in all.

¹³I have added the numerical notation in these paragraphs [nn.64-67] for ease of comprehension and reference.

¹⁴Syncope is when a syllable is removed from within a word, as ‘camra’ for ‘camera’.

¹⁵Scotus does not respond to the third argument, n.33 (similar omissions happen elsewhere in the Ordinatio, e.g. I d.3 nn.337-338, 402, d.7 n.2, d.11 n.6, d.12 nn.4-5).

¹⁶For the meaning of artificial water see nn.107-110 below.

¹⁷The Vatican editors note that several of these initial arguments are found in Richard of Middleton, and another in Thomas Aquinas.

¹⁸The Vatican editors note that all these properties are found already in William of Militon and Richard of Middleton.

¹⁹The four synods, according to Bede Retraction concerning the Acts of Apostles 21.25, are first when Matthias was chosen to replace Judas among the Twelve (Acts 1), second when seven were chosen to be deacons (Acts 6), third about not imposing circumcision on the believing Gentiles (Acts 15), fourth about not preventing the believing Jews from performing the ceremonies of the Old Law (Acts 21).

²⁰If Christ’s passion was 33AD then 14 or 15 years later would be 47 or 48AD, which does not fit Scotus’ earlier remark from Comestor about the year, 45AD, when Peter came to Rome after passing through Antioch. If Christ’s passion was 30AD then the date from Comestor of Peter’s arrival in Rome fits better.

²¹Literally ‘baptism of breath or wind (flaminis)’, perhaps because the Holy Spirit (who inspires to baptism) is associated with wind, as in John 3.8 “The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit.” And again, John 20.22: “He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Spirit.” The baptism of blood is by martyrdom for the faith before baptism with water can be received. The baptism of water is also called in Latin the baptism of ‘the river’ (fluminis), perhaps in memory of John the Baptist who baptized in the Jordan river, but also perhaps for the sake of the jingle (flaminis - fluminis) as a memory device.

²²Scotus has drawn the arguments that follow, nn.40-44, from Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.6 princ.2 q.1.

²³Peter of Tarentaise, later Innocent V, in Sent. IV d.4 q.2 a.1 q.2, “Regeneration is double; one according to common law, which is done by the ministry of Mother Church, one according to a privilege of grace, which is done by divine power alone. In the first way a child in the womb cannot be reborn, in the second way he can. The first regeneration is done by baptism, the second by privilege of sanctification in the womb.”

²⁴The text breaks off here, with nothing more added.

²⁵Jacob de Voragine, Golden Legends, ‘On Saint Nicholas’ [ed. Maggioni, Florence, 1998, 38] “In addition, on the fourth and sixth weekday he sucked at the breast only once.”

²⁶King of the Visigoths in Spain (died 621), see Isidore, History of the Kings of the Goths, Vandals, and Swiss n.60. About the Council of Toledo, Decretals III tit.42 ch.3, Gregory IX, “He who is drawn violently by terrors and punishments and, lest he incur loss, has received the sacrament of baptism, such a one, as if being conditionally willing, is to be compelled to the observance of the Christian faith. In which case must be understood the decree of the Council of Toledo, where it is said that those who long ago were compelled to Christianity, as was done in the times of the most religious prince Sisebut.must be compelled also to maintain the faith, which by necessity they undertook.”

²⁷Two other cases are reported in ms. A of the Ordinatio, about monstrous births or an infant born with two heads. They are brought forward by Henry of Ghent Quodlibet VI qq. 14-15. Scotus however deals with these cases below in d.6 nn.61-67.

²⁸Argument taken from Richard of Middleton and Peter of Tarentaise.

²⁹Scotus, Rep. IV A d.5 qq.1-2, n.4, “To the next I say that in the water there is no sanctity nor anything supernatural, because it is not a subject capable of such a form; but this whole of ‘water along with word’ is one sign of sanctity and grace whereby the soul becomes holy, to which sign God is immediately present and gives the grace that it designates.”

³⁰Fourth Lateran Council: “But we, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter [Lombard], namely that one supreme thing is essence or divine nature, which neither generates nor is generated; yet it does not follow that there is a quaternity, because those three things - Father and Son and Holy Spirit - are that one thing.”

³¹Fourth Lateran Council: “In nothing, however, do we for this reason wish to derogate from the Monastery in Florence, of which Joachim himself is founder, because there is both institution according to rule there and salutary observance, especially since Joachim himself bade that all his writings be assigned to us [sc. Pope Innocent III], to be approved or even corrected by the judgment of the Apostolic See, dictating a letter which he undersigned in his own hand, wherein he firmly confesses he holds the faith that the Roman Church holds, which, by the disposition of the Lord, is mother and mistress of all the faithful.”

³²The sanctuary of Monte Sant’Angelo on Mount Gargano in Apulia in the South East of Italy is the oldest shrine to St. Michael in Western Europe. The story in the text is told by Jacob de Voragine, Legenda Aurea ch.141, “Therefore, as the Pope and the bishop with the citizens were instant on a three day fast, Michael appeared on this day to the bishop saying, ‘There is no need for you to dedicate the church which I have built; for I myself who built it have dedicated it.’”

³³We today would likely speak of ‘conjoined twins’ here.

³⁴Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae V ch.9, “It is well said that the singular too, when doubled and multiplied, makes all numbers, and that all numbers are composed of it and dissolve into it.”

³⁵Scotus seems to be following an example discussed more fully by Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VI q. 14.

³⁶The story is in Henry of Ghent, ibid.

³⁷“Others say that the water begins and ceases to be the sacrament in the same instant, namely in the final moment of speaking the form, ‘I baptize you’.” “‘Take away [detrahe] the word from the water’, that is, take away the form, and it will not be the sacrament of baptism. And note that Gandulphus Bononiensis said that the water itself is the sacrament, namely the element itself..; hence if an ass drink the water it drinks the sacrament. Others say it is impossible that an ass drink the sacrament.”

³⁸“For if something is owed to me under a condition and I receive what is owed, I have taken it before the existence of the condition; if the condition exist afterwards, it begins and ceases to be owed in the same instant.” The glossator criticizes the case because what the law says is false: the debtor was freed long ago, and the debt was not later owed even for an instant.

³⁹The Latin here, because of its vagueness, could also be translated to mean “in the case of a slave given by a man to his wife so that she free him, for she begins and ceases to have lordship in the same instant.” But Scotus does not take it this way in his response later [n.76].

⁴⁰‘Bernardican’ because Bernard of Pavia [d.1213], a noted glossator, came up with this and many like glosses on the law; see below n.184.

⁴¹This difference between baptism and the Eucharist is real enough, but one might wonder why it entails that one cannot administer baptism to oneself, for one can certainly wash oneself and speak words at the same time. Perhaps the answer is that Scotus does not intend this difference to show that it is altogether impossible to administer baptism to oneself, but rather to show why Christ could reasonably choose not to allow self-baptism but could reasonably choose to allow self-giving of the Eucharist. For the real reason self-baptizing is ruled out is Christ’s decision to rule it out, but this decision is well grounded in the reasons given in nn.84-87. Likewise, Christ could have decided to rule out self-giving of the Eucharist, but the difference of it from baptism as explained in nn.88-89 gave him good reason not to do so.

⁴²These first two arguments were added in the margin, probably by Scotus. They are not answered in the replies to arguments at the end [n.133]. In fact, however, they are basically the same as the objections in nn.113-114, which are answered there in nn.115-132.

⁴³“Those whom a drunkard has baptized, Christ has baptized. I do not fear a drunkard, because I pay attention to the dove, through which is said to me, ‘This is he who baptizes...’” [John 1.33].

⁴⁴Or St. James, which is likely a reference to Santiago de Compostela in North West Spain, which was one of the best-known pilgrimage destinations in Medieval Europe. Those who started on this pilgrimage from Paris (where Scotus lectured on and wrote some of what became the Ordinatio) would have to prepare many things for so long a journey on foot. They would typically start from the church of St James, or St-Jacques, in the Latin Quarter of Paris.

⁴⁵This opinion, as here expounded, is put together by Richard of Middleton [Sent. IV d.6 princ.4 q.2] from the statements of glossators, “Some say that he who receives baptism a second time, although he be ignorant he was baptized before, is irregular. Hence Decretum p.3 d.4 ch.117 etc.”

⁴⁶Decretals of Gregory IX with glosses V tit.15 ch.1, “Innocent III: The practice of the death-dealing and hateful art of catapultists and bowmen against Christians and Catholics we prohibit from now on under anathema.” Bernard of Pavia in the gloss, “‘Under anathema’: it seems that the canon is of a sentence already passed. Argument: for it matters a great deal whether something is prohibited by a law under anathema. ..or by a man; and then it seems that he is excommunicated. As argument for this: That if a judge say, ‘I command under penalty of excommunication’ or ‘I command under threat of excommunication’ or ‘of anathema’ or ‘under excommunication’ ‘that you do this’, the one who does the contrary is not excommunicated but is to be excommunicated. And everything is understood similarly when excommunication has been thus passed under a condition, ‘I excommunicate everyone who enters [ecclesiastical] orders secretly’, and then he who does the opposite is excommunicated.”

⁴⁷Abbot Thomas Gallus, who wrote a paraphrase/exposition of this work of Dionysius; the translation is not by him but was mistakenly attributed to him.

⁴⁸Damascene, Orthodox Faith, ch.84, “This cross is given to us as a sign on the forehead, in the way circumcision was given to Israel. This is the helmet and shield and trophy against the devil; these are the seal.”

⁴⁹That is, each singly of ‘those who remain in God’ received singly the same ‘holy sign’ or ‘seal’, and this they received long before baptism. Scotus’ point seems to be that the omission of ‘whose’ in the initial citation [n.209] gives the misleading impression that someone baptized receives an additional holy sign or seal. In fact, however, the true meaning is that everyone, those who were in communion before and he who has become so now, received the same sign or seal, and that this sign or seal, in context, was the laying of hands on the head and registration by the priests, and that it all preceded baptism. Hence it can have nothing to do with any sign or seal or ‘character’ impressed at baptism, and only the omission of ‘whose’ could insinuate otherwise.

⁵⁰Lombard speaks of character in Sent. V d.6 ch.2 n.3 and d.24 ch.13 n.1, but not in the sense of its being a necessary effect of the sacrament.

⁵¹A passage also quoted by Thomas Aquinas ST III q.63 a.1, and Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.5 princ.2 q.3. It reads more in full: “To have...and give and receive the sacrament of baptism is sufficiently clear to the pastors of the Catholic Church diffused through the whole world, by whom afterwards, with the authority of a plenary council at Carthage, the original custom was confirmed: that even a lamb that was going astray outside and had received the lord’s character outside from the deceiving plunderers of it, when coming to the safety of Christian unity, is corrected from going astray, freed from captivity, cured from the wound; yet the lord’s character on it is recognized rather than rejected, since that character is impressed by many, both wolves and on wolves, who are indeed seen inside; however, that they do not belong to the lamb, which is also one from many, is proved by the fruits of their morals.”

⁵²The editors of the Quarrachi edition add: “What Scotus says there about the sacraments of the New Law he now applies also to circumcision.”

⁵³Quarrachi editors: It seems that Scotus gets this view of Aquinas mainly through Richard of Middleton, who embraced it and expounded it at length.

⁵⁴A sign is a relation, because x’s being a sign of y is a relation that x has to y.

⁵⁵Sc. if intrinsic and extrinsic relations can both come extrinsically to a subject, the difference between them must be in something else and not in the subject directly, which something else will be the foundation.

⁵⁶Namely the characters of the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and holy orders.

⁵⁷Scotus oddly does not mention here the fourth sacrament of the seven, namely extreme unction or the sacrament of the sick, perhaps because it is implied under the sacrament of penance.

⁵⁸On the four kinds of quality, see Aristotle Categories 8.8b26-10a26. The first kind is habits and dispositions; the second natural capacities and incapacities (healthy, sickly, hardness, softness); the third kind is the sensible qualities (sweet, bitter, black, white etc.); the fourth kind is figure and shape.

⁵⁹An interesting remark that can usefully be used to understand Scotus’ notorious claim that ‘being’ is a univocal concept; for it can thus be a univocal concept logically while an analogical one physically or really.

⁶⁰The Vatican editor’s punctuation of the Latin here, which seems misleading, has been altered in the translation.

⁶¹“Just as grace, which is the principle of spiritual life, is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, so character too, which is a spiritual power, is in the natural power of the soul as in a subject, and not in the essence of the soul.. .save through the intermediary of the power of the soul.”

⁶²From here to the end of the question the Vatican editors do not number the paragraphs. I have added numbers on my own account.

⁶³This third way and the fourth [n.44], contra the Vatican editors who think the third way is divided into two ways; but the two ways are really two authorities [n.28] proving the same way.

⁶⁴The point seems to be that if, as n.34 says, the bishops were those who took the place of the Apostles after their death, then Titus, who was not an Apostle but lived in the time of the Apostles, could not have been a bishop. Yet he was ordaining priests, which requires a bishop’s power. Therefore he was a bishop. Therefore it cannot be that bishops were those who succeeded to the Apostles after their death.

⁶⁵Commentary on the Five Books of the Decretals: “Innocent IV composed this book not so that he would be credited.. .he did not want these his glosses to make law.”